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Alain Hirsch, and Irving M. Pollack
MR. MUNDHEIM: Fortunately we have some regulators on the
panel, and while they are not representing official positions of the
regulatory bodies with which they are associated, I think it would
be useful to get their reactions to the proposal which has just been
made. I might start with Peter Lee. How do you react?
1. A BRITISH POINT OF VIEW
MR. LEE: Just to demonstrate the commonality that already
exists, let me say at the outset, in good SEC tradition, that any
views expressed are mine alone.
I believe that Harold Williams' and Lee Spencer's proposal
for greater liaison and understanding between the regulatory authori-
ties of the world is one that should be seriously considered. Har-
monization is probably not an easy objective; however, we should
become more aware of each other's problems so that even though we
may have very different systems, we can avoid conflicts between our
systems and also avoid malpractices falling between two regulatory
stools. We can also help each other to discover relevant informa-
tion and perhaps--although I think this is much more difficult--con-
sider cooperation in the enforcement field.
A. Discovering Beneficial Owners
In my allotted span of seven hundred and fifty seconds, I
want to discuss two topics from a U.K. perspective: first, a dis-
covery problem and, second, the extraterritorial reach problem. In
recent years there has developed a growing concern in various quar-
ters in the U.K. about the difficulty of discovering the identity of
the true or ultimate owner of shares in a U.K. company, particularly
where the registered holder is a foreign entity. This concern, which
has grown since the abolition of exchange control in Autumn 1979, is
shared by regulatory authorities and public companies alike.
The problem exists within both our statutory and our self-
regulatory systems. Pursuant to Section 27 of our 1976 Companies
Act, any company listed on the Stock Exchange may require the regis-
tered holder of shares to disclose, if it lies within his knowledge,
the name of the beneficial owner. Where the shares are held in the
name of a company, an answer that the company holds the shares bene-
ficially may be literally true and satisfies the statutory require-
ment; but the answer may be totally uninformative. What the company
whose shares are so held requires to know is, who is the owner of
the shares or, at least, who controls the intermediate company that
is registered as the shareowner?
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In the self-regulatory area, the Take-over Panel has a rule,
Rule 34, which requires an offer to be made for the whole company
if thirty percent of the voting rights are acquired by one person
or a group of persons acting in concert. The Panel may have some
difficulty in establishing the existence of such a holding if the
shares are registered in the names of foreign companies. It may
not be easy to discover the name of the ultimate owner, thus perhaps
preventing all the necessary inquiries to establish whether or not
there exists a group of people acting in concert holding thirty per-
cent or more.
If the intermediate company in question is a U.K. company,
it will probably be reasonably easy to discover the ultimate owner-
ship of that company, assuming of course that the trail does not
lead to a foreign company. But the chances of making any headway if
it is a foreign intermediate company--whether of Panama, Hong Kong,
Lichtenstein, or wherever--are about zero. I have no ready solution
to this problem and would be glad of suggestions. I do not believe
it can ever be fully conquered, whatever requirements all nations
introduce; for, what can be done where the intermediate company has
bearer shares or is controlled by a blind or discretionary trust?
Self-help by U.K. companies may be an answer. They might
include in their articles of association express powers to disen-
franchise from voting rights any shares held by intermediaries or
others where the ultimate ownership was concealed. The Commission
des Operations de Bourse requirement in takeovers that the identity
of the ultimate purchaser be disclosed suggests other avenues; but
I do not think that even the COB, for which I have great respect,
would ever be told more than the name of the intermediate or shell
company. The difficulties I have described are equally applicable
to the investigation of insider dealing; but Marie-Claude Robert
will describe the French experience in that field, which is similar
to that of the United Kingdom. Of course, assuming that a wrong is
discovered--and discovery is the point I have been trying to empha-
size just now--assuming a wrong is discovered, a much larger and
more difficult area is that of enforcing domestic requirements
against a foreigner. But I am glad to say that in general the Panel
has had no major difficulty in this field.
B. Extraterritorial Reach
My second and final topic concerns the impact that foreign
requirements may have on the domestic transactions of another coun-
try. If a U.K. company bids in shares for a U.K. target company,
that offer cannot be extended, as we heard from Lee Spencer earlier,
to any U.S. shareholders in the target company unless the offeror's
securities are registered with the SEC. It seems to me unfortunate
that U.S. shareholders are prevented from receiving the same offer
as, for example, U.K. shareholders in the same company, just because
the offeror's securities are not registered in the U.S.
In trying to protect U.S. shareholders in this way, the SEC
may end up depriving them of an offer. Is such protection really
necessary? If a U.S. citizen holds securities in a foreign company,
could he not be taken, should he not be taken, to accept that the
requirements of that foreign jurisdiction are his sole protection?
Certain SEC proposals of the 29th of November 1979 [l], went a lot
further. One result of those proposals, if I understand them right,
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would be that tender offers made for shares of foreign issuers out-
side the U.S. would violate U.S. law unless U.S. shareholders re-
ceived the same offer after compliance with U.S. tender offer rules.
Now, we have just seen that the same offer would not be permitted
if it were a share offer and the offeror did not register its secu-
rities with the SEC. Hence, if an offeror were not prepared to break
U.S. law--a reasonable stance to take--the proposed provision could
have the effect of inhibiting, for example, one U.K. company from
bidding for another U.K. company if the offeror were unable to make
the same offer to the U.S. shareholders. This does seem to me an
Alice-in-Wonderland result. I do believe that regulatory authorities
should be hesitant--and when I use the word hesitant, I am being
euphemistic--about implementing provisions that have an impact on
transactions that have only a tenuous connection with that state.
The Take-over Panel would not attempt to regulate any tender
offer made for, say, General Motors, even though General Motors has
a listing on the London Stock Exchange and a number of U.K. share-
holders. I believe the tail should not be allowed to wag the dog,
on whichever side of the Atlantic the dog happens to be.
MR. MUNDHEIM: I take it, Peter, that you are saying that with
respect to takeovers, the law of the target company ought to apply,
in terms of defining the rules with which the offeror must comply?
MR. LEE: That is right, Bob. Obviously there are going to
be gray areas where it is difficult to decide with which country
certain targets are principally connected.
MR. MUNDHEIM: And you would look at the appropriate law as
being not necessarily the law of incorporation, but the place where
the principal office and the principal business is carried on?
MR. LEE: That is right. We would take the view that if it
were a U.K. company, then U.K. provisions would apply. I believe
we would also take the view that if it were registered elsewhere for
purely tax reasons, perhaps, but its central office and its manage-
ment were in the U.K., then I think we would feel it was a U.K. com-
pany.
MR. MUNDHEIM: Lee Spencer, if I heard the rumble in the
audience correctly, I have the impression that Peter Lee's proposal
is viewed as a very sensible one. Is it one that the Commission
could accept?
MR. SPENCER: Something along those lines--I would hate to be
either the tail or the dog. Choosing the side of the dog for a mo-
ment, let me say that perhaps our bark was worse than our bite will
be. The proposal was quite broad and, without doubt, the Commission
had left the comment period for rationalizing what is a difficult
area. It appreciated the comment it received, and I think there is
little, if any, chance that proposed Rule 14e-4 will be adopted in
that form. Whether or not the particular modification that Peter
Lee suggested would be the right modification is a matter of conjec-
ture. An alternative would be to consider maintaining the status quo,
which avoids the conflict but may not be perfect. This alternative
would be to say that so long as an offer is not made to any U.S.
shareholder, then our rules do not apply. That is the way it works
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now. The result--which is not perfect--is that, again, U.S. share-
holders are excluded from the offer. There are ways and means they
can dispose of their shares, for example, abroad; but there are
still transaction costs and accessibility questions.
Peter Lee said, in effect, that if you are a shareholder of
a foreign corporation you should know that different rules of the
game apply. There is a healthy argument to that effect. One dif-
ficulty I would point out is: where do you draw the line? For ex-
ample, think of the buyers of foreign securities in a public offer-
ing. Could you not say that they know it is a foreign issuer; and
therefore, all that prospectus disclosure presently required is not
really warranted? The result would be that U.S. companies would be
filing competitively sensitive information but their foreign compe-
tition would not. That may not be an entirely happy policy result.
There is a substantial degree of merit in what Peter Lee said, but
I am not sure that his solutions are exactly the right ones.
MR. MUNDHEIM: Perhaps Peter would argue that his theory for
tender offers need not necessarily be applied to all transactions in
a company's stock. Where there is an active trading market in a
stock, the jurisdiction in which that market exists might appropri-
ately set rules for required disclosure to maintain the integrity of
that market. Similarly, where there is an effort to sell investors
on buying a security, those investors can be protected by the juris-
diction in which they are located. But in a tender offer the inves-
tors in the target company know that they have their money in an
enterprise which is protected only by U.K. law and not by the more
stringent U.S. regulation.
The other point that Peter raised is relevant to insider trading.
The COB has had some experience in trying to deal with insider trad-
ing which originated outside France. Claudie, I thought you might
guide us through some of that experience.
2. A FRENCH POINT OF VIEW4
E ROBERT*: The internationalization of the market is an
important fact in France: one hundred sixty-three foreign companies
are listed on the French stock exchanges and twenty-six French com-
panies are listed on a foreign stock exchange [2]. The value of
foreign purchases of French shares was roughly $1 billion in 1979,
and French purchases of foreign shares amounted to $3.2 billion [3].
This explains the interest of the French stock exchange authorities,
the Commission des Operations de Bourse (COB) [4], in two main is-
sues: (1) how to maintain adequate supervision of the market and
control the solicitation of French investors, and (2) how to assure
equal treatment of French shareholders as far as disclosure by for-
eign companies is concerned.
When the COB accepts the securities of a foreign company for
listing on the stock exchange, it watches to see that French share-
holders will be given the same rights and opportunities as the share-
holders of the home country, and at the same time. Generally, the
exercise of their rights by the shareholders depends on the thorough
and rapid circulation of information.
*The views expressed in this article are the personal ones of the
author.
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The second issue is related to the effective supervision of
the market and, more specifically, to the question of insider trad-
ing. The COB can generally detect insider trading by watching the
market; but it cannot trace the name of the seller or of the buyer
when an order has been given from a foreign country by a foreign
bank. There are also difficulties arising from the dissemination
of illegal offerings from foreign countries.
The solution to these two problems presupposes cooperation
among the supervisory authorities of the different stock exchanges,
and mutual confidence in their efficiency. This cooperation, how-
ever, meets with obstacles. Some of these are technical, and the
experience of the COB shows they can be solved; but some of them are
more political, and the solutions have to be found in international
agreements and changes in national laws.
I shall start with the greatest deterrent to effective super-
vision of the market: secrecy laws. Later I shall talk about other
problems that are more technical, the solutions reached, and the
directions followed by the COB in connection with international co-
operation.
A. Secrecy Laws as an Obstacle to Effective Supervision
The secrecy problem has two aspects: the COB, watching the
market, faces the barrier of secrecy laws in foreign countries, but
it also faces the problem of French secrecy laws as an obstacle to
international cooperation.
(i) COB expersehce with secrecy laws in foreign countries
In France, insider trading has been a criminal offense since
December 23, 1970 [5]. During the past ten years, the COB has un-
dertaken about 250 investigations in which major buyers have been
identified [6]. In about forty of these investigations orders com-
ing from a foreign country have been considered questionable. The
country involved has mainly been Switzerland.
It is important to understand why it is essential for the COB
to know the name of a seller or buyer before sending evidence to the
Attorney General. The explanation lies in the phrase used to define
the offense under the law. A person who has committed an offense is
supposed to have received the unpublished, price-sensitive informa-
tion through his "function or profession." The Commission has to
demonstrate a connection between the person and the company whose
securities are involved in the transaction. Even though foreign
orders are not numerous, the Commission is concerned that if they
should increase, they could interfere with the smooth functioning of
the market.
The COB has been in touch with the Director General of the
Banker's Association of Switzerland in Basle since 1972. He has
been informed of all orders that could be considered insider trans-
actions. Since 1975, the Commission has not only informed the
Banker's Association of Switzerland of the relevant facts, but it
has also directly notified the Swiss banks that are involved. Gen-
erally, if the identity of the customer is not revealed, the banks
concerned make their own inquiry and give their opinion to the Com-
mission. They are anxious to protect the reputation of their estab-
lishments and wish to avoid serving customers who violate French law.
The development of an understanding between the Commission and bank-
ing organizations in Switzerland is considered a positive step.
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With regard to stock market orders coming from other coun-
tries, the Commission has received active cooperation from the
Take-over Panel in London and from the Belgian Banking Commission.
In recent cases, the actions of these two organizations--as well as
the actions of the banks that had transmitted the orders--were based
on the recommendations of the European Community Commission of July
25, 1977 [7], which dealt with transactions in transferable securi-
ties. One of the main provisions stated that any person who, while
pursuing his profession or carrying out his duties, comes into pos-
session of information that is not public and that relates to a
company, or to the market in its securities, or to any event that
is of general interest to the market and is price-sensitive, should
refrain from engaging in any transaction where such information is
used and should refrain from giving this information to another per-
son so that he may profit from it before it becomes public.
The actions of the Panel and the Belgian Commission, however,
were limited to urgent requests to the organizations involved, but
none of them would reveal the names of their customers. These ex-
periences demonstrate that without conventions among the countries,
efficient cooperation among supervisory authorities is very diffi-
cult to achieve.
The secrecy problem leads to the adoption of measures to pre-
vent orders from coming from a foreign country when a buyer or sell-
er declines in advance to reveal its identity. This solution has
been adopted in the French regulation on takeover bids and exchange
offers [8]. The rule requires disclosure of significant market
transactions during the period of the takeover bid. Every day after
the close of the Exchange, the companies involved in the bid, direc-
tors and shareholders who hold more than five percent of its stock,
and all persons or companies acting in concert must inform the
authorities of any purchase or sale of shares of the target company
(and of the offeror, if it is an offer for exchange). These trans-
actions are published in the Stock Exchange official bulletin. In
1978, the same obligation to disclose information was extended to
any person who had directly acquired as little as 0.5 percent of the
shares of the target company since the beginning of the takeover bid
[91.
At the same time, rules were established to prevent buyers
from maintaining anonymity by using a foreign agent [10]. The vari-
ous agents who are involved in the transmission of a purchase order
during the tender offer must agree to disclose to the Commission, if
asked, the identity of the person they are acting for. If they are
not acting for their own account, they must first advise the buyer
that the transmission of a buying order creates a commitment to
follow the established rules and, in consequence, the buyer's iden-
tity will be disclosed to the Commission, if requested. The appli-
cation of these rules is considered satisfactory for the present
time. During the period of the tender offer the Commission is able
to identify rapidly the persons engaging in transactions, and only
those prepared to be identified can trade.
The idea of extending this procedure to everyone on a per-
manent basis is most inviting. The regulations could be applied
to all orders coming from a foreign country; but, of course, the
measure is opposed by market intermediaries who execute orders for
foreign investors. A procedure of this kind would probably be
acceptable only if all the major stock exchanges and regulatory
authorities were ready to act in concert.
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(ii) The new French secrecy provisions
In spite of the desire of the COB to help foreign authorities
and the belief that this help is part of the effective supervision
of its own market, there have previously been two main obstacles to
such help: French bank secrecy laws and the limited investigative
powers of the Commission. Moreover, on July 11, 1980, a new law [11]
was adopted by the French Parliament that is going to make coopera-
tion even more difficult for the COB.
Banks assume they are bound by section 378 of the Criminal
Code [12], which imposes penalties on any person who receives secret
information by reason of his position or profession and transmits
such information to others. There is no clear court decision on the
matter, but some recent decisions seem to imply that section 378
could be applied to bankers. In addition, section 19 of the law of
December 2, 1945 [13], states that any officer or employee of a na-
tional bank, or any person having to supervise a national or a pri-
vate bank, is bound by professional secrecy; that is, bound by sec-
tion 378.
In case of a violation of the secrecy law, a bank is civilly
liable, and an employee is criminally and civilly liable. There are
some exceptions to the secrecy requirement: a banker cannot refuse
to give testimony in civil or criminal proceedings, and he cannot
refuse to disclose information if asked by the banking commission
[14] or the COB [15]. The power of the COB to require disclosure
of professional secrets by bankers or brokers is limited, however,
to situations involving registered companies.
Frequently, when a foreign organization has asked the Commis-
sion for assistance, it has not been able to oblige because the
transactions were in non-public companies and, consequently, coopera-
tion depended on the attitude of the bank involved. The COB re-
ceived requests for aid several times from the SEC, and it was able
to help in most of the cases, but not in all of them.
In cases involving manipulations on the Montreal Stock Ex-
change, the COB participated actively in the investigations by
gathering evidence from French investors who had bought the Canadian
shares. When the representatives of the Commission des Valeurs
Mobilieres du Quebec went to Paris, they were given the opportunity
of hearing the witnesses in the Canadian embassy in Paris. This
could easily be done because the French investors were interested
in the proceeding. Now, however--and, in my view, unfortunately--
even the types of cooperation given to the SEC may no longer be
possible because of the new law adopted in July 1980 [16].
The new law promulgated in July 1980 provides that
a) Without prejudice to international treaties or agreements, a natural
person of French nationality or customarily residing on French territory, or
director, representative, agent or official of an artificial person with head-
quarters or an establishment on French territory, shall not communicate in
writing, orally, or in any other form, regardless of place, to the public au-
thorities of another country documents or information of an economic, commercial,
industrial, financial or technical nature where such communication is likely to
threaten France's sovereignty, security or basic economic interests or the
public order, as defined by the administering authority when necessary.
b) Without prejudice to international treaties and agreements or to
current laws and regulations, a person shall not ask for, seek, or communicate
in writing, orally, or in any other form, documents or information of an economic
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commercial, industrial, financial or technical nature that may constitute
proof with respect to legal or administrative proceedings in another country
or in the framework of such proceedings. [17)
These provisions were adopted without consulting the Commis-
sion, and their primary aim was to protect the maritime trade. The
particular event that gave rise to this law was the American Federal
Trade Commission's investigation of several foreign companies, with
resulting administrative sanctions. One French company was involved
[18]. After a discussion in the Senate, the law was extended to
cover all means of transport, and then, to all economic and finan-
cial matters. In the first drafts, only companies or private indi-
viduals, as distinguished from administrative agencies, were regu-
lated; but then control was extended to all persons and agencies [19].
The members of Parliament did not consider the position of
the COB, which has, following the example of the American agencies,
investigative powers nearly as strong as the judicial authorities.
Parliament just gave thought to the normal investigative powers of
the judiciary, which can be exercised according to the convention
of The Hague [20] or any bilateral agreement for judicial help [21].
Since the passage of this law, the Commission is completely paralyzed
and cannot participate in an international investigation--even a
European one under the Code of Conduct.
There are now two problems to be settled instead of one:
(1) the Commission would like to have a specific exemption from the
law of July 1980, to permit an investigation for judicial or ad-
ministrative proceedings in a foreign country; and (2) the Commission
believes that it is necessary to have conventions such as the Euro-
pean Code of Conduct, but with stronger, binding authority that would
allow for real cooperation in the supervision of the markets.
B. Future Directions in International Cooperation
There are two different kinds of international cooperation:
one is formal and takes place through international agreements; the
other is informal and can be either ad hoc or organized for an un-
limited term.
(1) Formal cooperation
It is clear that in order to solve the problem of interna-
tional cooperation in investigations--which is necessary for effec-
tive supervision of the market--the formal direction will have to
be followed. An international agreement is necessary, but it has
to be widely adopted or it will not be very useful. As long as in-
sider trading is not an offense in Switzerland, for example, French
insiders, using the channel of the Swiss banks, are going to be un-
identified and unpunished.
Within the EEC, a draft directive on insider dealings is being
prepared [22]. If it is adopted, the national laws of each member
country will have to be altered to conform and make such dealings an
offense. Then control authorities of the EEC countries will have a
sound basis on which to proceed when investigations are necessary.
In the case of listing rules, two directives (23] have al-
ready established a contact committee for international cooperation.
The committee will have as its function, "to facilitate the harmon-
ized implementation of this Directive throdgh regular consultations
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on any practical problems arising from its application on which ex-
changes of views are deemed useful; to facilitate consultation be-
tween Member States on the supplements to and improvements of the
listing particulars that the competent authorities are entitled to
require or recommend at a national level" (24]. The competent
authorities of the Member States are invited "to exchange informa-
tion and use their best endeavors to achieve maximum coordination
of their requirements concerning listing particulars, to avoid a
multiplicity of formalities, and to agree to a single text requiring,
at the most, translation where appropriate and supplements that may
be necessary to meet the individual requirements of each Member
State"[25].
The COB attended, as an observer, the recent Montreal Con-
ference of the Inter-American Securities Regulators and Similar
Agencies [26]. Previous meetings have been held in Caracas, Buenos
Aires, Mexico and Rio de Janeiro. One purpose of these conferences
is to exchange experiences and discuss problems faced by the control
authorities in each country. Even if there are few concrete results,
the formal meetings encourage the formation of informal groups among
the participants and facilitate contact when problems do arise.
(ii) Informal cooperation
Two types of informal cooperation have been employed so far.
The first type is used to solve in a short period of time a specific
technical problem such as the exercise of shareholders' rights with
respect to a new issue or a takeover bid. The other type involves
organizing periodic meetings of representatives of the control
authorities to examine their common problems.
The general rule is that a listed company issuing new shares
must publish a prospectus with an endorsement by the COB before the
shares may be disseminated f27]. As there is not much time to check
the prospectus, the COB is satisfied with the same prospectus that
was distributed in the company's home country, or a translation of
it. Often, there are telephone contacts with the Banking Commission
in Belgium and with the London Stock Exchange.
When Amax, a U.S. company listed in Paris, proposed a rein-
vestment-of-dividends plan to its shareholders, the prospectus that
was sent to French shareholders was the SEC prospectus, with the
addition of a French language comment on its main technical features
and tax rules for French investors. In appropriate circumstances,
the French Commission relies on supervision by the foreign control
authorities.
In one example of a takeover situation, the COB had to inter-
vene when a Canadian company made a tender offer to the stockholders
of Credit Foncier Franco-Canadien (CFFC). CFFC is also a Canadian
company, and its shares are traded on the Montreal and Paris Ex-
changes. As soon as the Canadian company's plan to make an offer
became known, the COB received an inquiry asking whether the French
regulations applied in these circumstances, and to what extent the
COB viewed this matter as within its purview. This transaction pre-
sented a special case, for the principal market for CFFC shares is
in Paris and more than two-thirds of these shares were held by French
residents. The most important shareholder was the group of the Com-
pagnie Financi~re de Paris et des Pays-Bas, which held twenty-one
percent of CFFC capital.
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Because the tender offer target was a Canadian company, it
was subject to the laws of that country. Moreover, the matter was
initially presented to the Montreal Exchange authorities. Thus, it
was the Canadian regulations with respect to tender offers that
should have applied [28]. At the same time, the French Exchange
authorities were responsible for the sound functioning of the French
market and for the accuracy of information given about the securi-
ties. They could not decline to take an interest in the manner in
which the tender offer would be made. The COB had to decide whether
or not to permit the tender offer.
In addition to communications between the COB and the banks
and lawyers representing the companies affected by the offer, the
COB was constantly in contact with the Stock Exchange Commission in
Quebec, in order to keep the latter informed, as much as possible,
of the information needed by the French public. In this instance,
it was possible for the COB to permit French shareholders to delay
their response to the offer. This was quite indispensable, since
offers made in Canada are permitted to have a shorter duration than
offers made in France. Specifically, the date of the offer's ex-
piration was initially set for the 19th of January 1979, but it was
extended to the 19th of February 1979, so the offer was outstanding
for almost nine weeks.
Inside the EEC informal cooperation takes place, at the present
time, through periodic meetings of the representatives of the con-
trol authorities. Three groups can be mentioned: one is in charge
of the mutual funds question; one supervises disclosures by listed
companies; and one implements the directive of the European Code of
Conduct relating to transactions in transferable securities.
It is interesting to note part of the explanatory memorandum
of the Code:
The lack of full information on the securities themselves and ignorance or mis-
understanding of the rules governing the various markets have certainly helped
to confine the investments of the great majority of savers to the markets of
the countries in which they live or to a few well-known major international
securities.
A reduction in these disparities would therefore tend to encourage the inter-
penetration of the member countries' markets, particularly if this were ac-
companied by the improvement of safeguards available to savers. [29]
For implementation of the Code, the Commission recommends
that the member states
appoint one or more representatives from these associations or authorities who
shall be responsible for informing the Commission each year--beginning one year
after the transmission of this recommendation--of any measures adopted to im-
plement it, of the experience in applying them, of any difficulties encountered,
and of any suggestions for additions or amendments to the European Code of
Conduct. [30]
A meeting has been organized each year. In 1980 the group
examined changes that had occurred in the securities laws of each
member state and methods for implementing the Code [31]. A meeting
will be held before the end of 1981 to examine the problems raised
by the implementation of the Code, mainly those occurring between a
member state and a foreign country.
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Informal cooperation among supervisory authorities has taken
place for some time and will no doubt continue to be an effective,
if limited, regulatory tool. Significant progress in dealing with
the international aspects of the securities markets probably re-
quires something more, however. For EEC member countries, such
cooperation is being formalized through a series of directives that
embody both substantive rules of general applicability and the
mechanism for cooperation among the supervisory authorities [32].
There would seem to be three possible methods for extending
this kind of cooperation beyond the EEC: (1) formal bilateral or
multilateral treaties; (2) informal cooperation through a regularly
meeting committee, such as the Cooke Committee in the banking area;
and (3) cooperation directed toward the establishment of internation-
al standards, which any supervisory authority or exchange could
adopt and from which certain privileges would automatically follow.
An example of such standards is, perhaps, an agreement not to accept
trades from countries that refuse to reveal information regarding
beneficial owners.
My own view is that formal treaties take too long and are too
difficult of amendment to be useful in the rapidly changing area of
securities regulation. The time seems quite ripe, however, for
initiatives in the other two areas mentioned; and the COB would be
quite interested in following those paths.
3. A SWISS POINT OF VIEW
MR. MUNDHEIM: Thank you, Claudie. One of the points you
have made, and it is a common point in talking about enforcement
problems, is that all of our problems would be a lot easier if the
trading activity had not originated in Switzerland. Alain, we must
put the question to you directly. Is the Swiss secrecy law really
an insurmountable obstacle to effective regulation in an interna-
tional world? A one word answer, yes or no, will do.
MR. HIRSCH: . . . it should be!?
A. Harmonization in the Securities Field
First of all, I would very much like to support Peter Lee
when he said that he fully agreed with the proposal of Harold Wil-
liams and Lee Spencer to have an informal international committee
for cooperation on securities questions--a committee similar to the
one for banks that we discussed before. Not only is it sensible,
but I do not see why it could not be done. Certainly, the first
task would be to assure a mutual exchange of information and mutual
understanding, just as this conference seeks to do and does. This
would be highly useful, as it proved to be in the banking system.
A part of the problem is that the relevant authorities are not al-
ways very easy to identify. This may be one difference between
developing effective cooperation in the banking field and in the
securities field.
Another important difference is that in the banking world the
main goals of the regulators are broadly similar in all western
countries, while in the securities field this may not be the case.
For instance, the significance of disclosure is greater in countries
like the U.S. where securities are so much more aggressively marketed
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than in many European countries. To give a good example, some secu-
rities have been sold in a more aggressive way in Europe--the mutual
funds. Immediately regulations were enacted in European countries
like Switzerland and Germany, which previously had no regulation of
the securities business. As soon as the mutual funds started push-
ing their sales, regulation came.
It seems to me that harmonizing securities regulations in the
U.S. and Europe probably would not make sense, because a lowering
of the standard in the U.S. would possibly cause damage--that is for
you to say--and probably a great increase in the amount of disclo-
sure required in Europe would just be over-regulation.
Moreover, the importance of privacy in economic life may be
appreciated very differently in the two places. Yesterday in a work-
shop I heard somebody saying, an American I believe, "If a person
does not want to disclose exactly what he owns and what shares he
has, it can only be for bad reasons--tax evasion, exchange control,
and so on--and that should not be allowed." Somebody else, also an
American, said, "Well, it may be for very good reasons: for in-
stance, fear of government changes, fear of political measures a-
gainst him, and perhaps the general feeling that privacy should be
respected as much as possible even in financial and economic matters,
because they cannot be completely separated from other personal mat-
ters."
In light of these big differences, I think the difficulties
of harmonization are great; but they are not impossible to overcome,
if the parties are ready to try to understand each other's point of
view. The U.S. surely realizes that if it regulates its market for
foreigners in exactly the way it regulates for Americans, it will
result in isolation of the American market. The foreign issuer
always asks, "How far will the American regulators go with possible
exceptions for foreigners?"
I would like to deal with this problem for a minute, not so
much with respect to the issuers and continuing information about
securities, but rather with regard to market regulations. A major
problem is: Who is the beneficial owner of the shares of stock?
Of bonds? If the aim is to have an answer to these questions in
each and every case, for acquisitions small and large, there will be
resistance to supplying the information. Foreign institutions will
never be willing to answer these questions, especially for normal
transactions in day-to-day business. The questions can be asked
only for exceptional, unusual transactions; and I assume that nor-
mally only these unusual transactions lead to significant market
manipulation.
Of course, what I call an unusual transaction could be more
precisely defined. It is not necessarily my view that a uniform
global amount should be defined. For instance, if an American citi-
zen has no account in a Swiss bank at all, is not known, and comes
to open an account for, let us say, a hundred thousand dollars
(which is not a large account) for the sole purpose of buying one
single American security, this could very well be considered an ex-
ceptional investment.
The first condition for international cooperation should be
to limit its scope to certain types of unusual transactions. The
second condition should be--and we have also discussed this before--
the agreement by American regulators to be content, at least to a
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reasonable extent, with verification done by independent external
auditors in the country concerned. This leaves open the question
of what happens if something improper has really been done. Should
the foreign bank--for example, the Swiss bank--at the end of the
day give the name of the client to the U.S. authorities, or is it
always protected by Swiss banking secrecy? There is no very easy
answer to this, but I would suggest that at least in some cases,
total refuge is not afforded by the secrecy rules governing Swiss
banks.
B. The Swiss Banking Agreement
Swiss bank secrecy has its limits. The limits were not wide-
ly known until a few years ago, although they have always existed.
They were not known because the Swiss banks had been clever enough
to make everybody believe that Swiss bank secrecy had no limits,
but that was not true. As long as only the clients believed this,
it was entirely advantageous; but then some regulators also began
to think that no limits existed. Then Switzerland concluded that it
should indicate the limits. This was done, for instance, in 1977
with the signing of the Swiss Banking Agreement 133] which I would
now like to discuss briefly. This could be a good beginning of an
answer to the question Bob put to me earlier.
This agreement is a private agreement, governed by private
law, implemented by private arbitration, with very high fines. I
will not discuss the specifics of the agreement today. I will tell
you that a report has just been issued, and will soon be published
in Switzerland, about all the cases decided under this agreement.
The implementation by the Swiss National Bank has been very tough.
Coming back to the legal point, however, it is a curious
private agreement with a definitely public aim and implementation
mainly by the Swiss National Bank. So it is really something be-
tween a private agreement and a public regulation. Amusingly enough,
it probably is more efficient than any law would be, because the
legislature would not dare to establish the high financial liabili-
ties that were provided in this agreement and that have been imposed.
The text of the agreement itself is brief. It has been signed
by all the Swiss banks with no exceptions. The text of the agreement
is followed by commentaries. These commentaries are much more than
mere commentaries. They are remarks expressing a unified and harmoni-
ous interpretation of the agreement, accepted by the Swiss Banking
Association and the Swiss National Bank. So, the commentaries are
like a part of the agreement itself.
The agreement was primarily intended not to introduce new
rules, but to confirm traditional good-banking practices. In some
fields it definitely went beyond that. The aim of it, I want to in-
sist, is to ensure that banks do not make improper use of Swiss bank-
ing secrecy. Especially, they may not accept funds that derive from
criminal offenses and may not aid and abet capital flight, tax eva-
sion, or the like. I do not elaborate on that, because it is outside
our present subject of regulating the capital markets.
This could, however, be part of a discussion on the develop-
ment of a movement toward cooperation. There is a possibility of
amending and supplementing the banking agreement, so that it could
also be applied to precisely defined infringements of recognized
securities rules.
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My interest today focuses on articles 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7, which
describe how a Swiss bank is now obliged to ascertain the real owner
of an account. In this regard, the Swiss banks, I think, are under
the strictest standards of the whole world. Certainly Swiss rules
are stricter than those of any European and, probably, any American
bank. Banks are to ascertain, with due care, not only the exact
identity of the physical person or the corporate entity that opens
an account, but also whether this legal or personal entity is acting
for its own account or as trustee for somebody else [34]. If so,
the bank has to know the name of the beneficial owners. More than
that, the bank must determine whether the owner of the account is a
corporate entity that has no real economic activity--that is, a so-
called shell company. Whether a Swiss or a foreign shell company,
technically it acts for its own account; but, of course, in practice
it acts for its sole or majority shareholder. The bank has the duty
of knowing the identity of the shareholders and of refusing to open
the account if it does not. There is a great exception, an important
exception, if the members of the board of directors of such a com-
pany are acting in a professional capacity, as defined by the agree-
ment. In this case, they need only assure the bank that they know
the real owners and will be responsible for seeing that the agree-
ment is not violated by these persons.
I do not pretend that such an agreement is--as Peter Lee said
some time ago--a full, complete, and final answer to the question of
who is the owner and how he should be regulated. It is less than
that, but it is a reasonable way of arriving at a solution to the
problem. It is a reasonable approach which could perhaps be adopted
by an international cooperative committee. Let us see whether other
countries would adopt it.
MR. MUNDHEIM: I just want to be clear about one thing, Alain.
Assume a Swiss bank knows or discovers that a client is engaging or
has engaged in insider trading in American stocks. Would there be
a bar on either that Swiss bank or the Banking Commission or the
Swiss National Bank, if they were aware of that information, from
giving it to Lee Spencer in aid of an SEC inquiry?
MR. HIRSCH: Today the answer is, in principle, yes. There
would be a bar to telling the name of the client, except in very
unusual cases where banking secrecy had been abused in a highly im-
proper manner. But one may find some adequate means to insure that,
at least in a good number of cases, either the names could be given or
--much more important--that in receiving the orders of the clients,
the bank would make certain that it was not giving orders for an
insider. In practice, that is usually the case--and today, more and
more so--because the Swiss banks have no interest whatsoever in hav-
ing troubles and questions from the SEC. This could for instance
be more formally regulated by an amendment to the Banking Agreement
of 1977.
4. AN AMERICAN POINT OF VIEW
MR. 4UNDHEIM: Today when we talk about SEC enforcement, every-
body thinks about Stanley Sporkin. But Irv Pollack taught Stanley
Sporkin everything he knows. That is fairly useful because Irv will
talk about how, as a practical enforcement matter, the SEC has been
able in certain cases to weave its way among sovereign sensitivities,
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and to be able to deal effectively with enforcement problems.
MR. POLLACK: First, perhaps to illustrate how difficult it
is to determine who the beneficial owners are, I am reminded of a
story they tell about the St. Louis Zoo where they had an old lion
who slept all day. This disturbed all of the people who came to
the zoo with their children. They complained to the zoo director
who finally brought in another young lion, and that young lion was
just terrific. It did acrobatics all day and kids were just en-
thralled with what they were seeing and the parents were delighted.
But when the first night came, the young lion got an apple, some
peanuts, and a banana; and the old lion got fifty pounds of steak
and fifty pounds of ground beef. Well, this, as you can expect,
disturbed the young lion a little bit, but he decided he had not per-
formed as well as expected. So the next day he performed even better,
and everybody was really excited that day, and he got great applause
from the audience. But that evening the same thing happened. He
got the banana, the peanuts, and the apple;and the old lion got all
the meat.
So he sidled up to the old lion and he said, "Hey, you have
been around here a long time. How come you sleep all day and they
give you all that good food, and I work my tail off and all I get is
the apple, banana, and peanuts?"
He said, "That is very simple. On the records they have you
as a monkey. . . . because they are only budgeted for one lion."
That illustrates the difficulty. You can be a dreamer and
you can worry about all of the formal international agreements that
you could make if you had complete harmony, without all the differ-
ences that exist in the world, and if you had all the time that it
takes to negotiate formal agreements. I think, as Alain Hirsch has
so well pointed out, you do not have the homogeneity in the securi-
ties field that you have in the banking field. Now, what happens
when you are confronted with a real problem? He mentioned the re-
action of the European countries when IOS went through the country
with a saw and started to take away some of the timbers that were
there in the financial community.
A. The IOS Problem
The SEC was confronted with that situation twice. Once in
1967 when IOS was under the control of a gentleman named Mr. Corn-
feld. We had very few American investors here, but our overall
appraisal was that IOS was engaging in improper conduct in the U.S.
through its activities here and through its sales techniques around
the world. In short, after violations of U.S. securities laws were
established in an SEC administrative proceeding, IOS agreed in a
settlement that it would not sell any of its securities in the U.S.,
in any of its territories, or indeed, to a U.S. citizen anywhere in
the world [35]. Shortly thereafter IOS floated a fifty million
dollar issue in Europe which was dissipated in a few months. This
set the stage for the next IOS escapade.
As you know, IOS was taken over by a man named Robert Vesco
who promised to rescue it from its financial difficulties. Initial-
ly Mr. Vesco said that he did not control Mr. Cornfeld's shares,
which purportedly had been sold to a series of foreign corporations.
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Secrecy laws around the world made it a bit difficult for the SEC
to show who really had the beneficial interest in this block of
shares. How do you determine that? By meticulously following the
paper record, intensively questioning the available participants,
carefully inquiring into the creation of the corporate entities,
and non-acceptance of spurious secrecy claims, you can frequently be
successful in overcoming attempts to conceal the true ownership.
Sometimes you may have to exert a little bit of leverage on people
and say, "Well, if Mr. Vesco does not own them maybe you own them;
and if you do not disclose who you were acting for, we will have to
assume you were acting for yourself." In the absence of full dis-
closure and an adequate explanation, the SEC may have to act against
a party who appears on the record as the owner of particular blocks
of shares.
Frequently you will get a degree of cooperation. It may take
some time. But intensive and persistent inquiry pays off. In any
event, the SEC, despite secrecy and other obstacles, not only in
Switzerland but elsewhere as well, was able to develop the necessary
evidence for a court action. Secrecy laws exist all around the
world and in varying degrees. Switzerland happens to be the place
that is frequently used because of the stability of the country, the
stability of its financial system, and the reputation of its people.
But people also tend to move for tax reasons or otherwise into other
countries. SEC investigators were confronted, for example, with the
bank secrecy law in the Bahamas, where a substantial portion of the
IOS monies had gone. Despite such obstacles, the SEC inquiry was
able to put together sufficient information to establish initially
that over two hundred million dollars had been siphoned out of the
IOS mutual funds that had been sold throughout the world, but prin-
cipally on the European continent. I believe, for example, two-
thirds of the investors in one fund were from Germany, and investors
from many other countries supplied the rest of the money.
Toward the end of 1972, the SEC determined it had enough evi-
dence to move into court against IOS, Vesco, and a number of other
people who were associated either as individuals or as entities in
that promotion. The result was an injunctive action against that
group for fraud and other violations of the U.S. securities laws;
and what was more important, there was an ancillary request for a
receiver [36]. Initially, the court declined to issue a temporary
restraining order prohibiting any further transfer of funds. The
court indicated a need to examine the voluminous documents filed with
the complaint. The defense also argued that nothing improper had
occurred; that all the money would eventually be brought into court
and be put on the table for the court to see; that the action was a
vendetta on the part of the SEC or the U.S. government because the
IOS funds were taken out of a U.S. bank and put into foreign bank
entities. However, the filing of the action led to an opening up of
the whole operation insofar as other countries were involved. For
example, a bank in Luxembourg had acted as an 1OS fund depository
but unfortunately had been induced to sub-deposit over a hundred and
fifty million dollars in a Bahamian bank and could not get these
funds back.
In any event, on the basis of further hearings and proof, a
receiver was appointed by the court and an order was issued giving
him jurisdictional control over all of the IOS assets wherever they
might be located. The court also issued'a variety of orders that
were needed to protect against further depredation of the IOS funds.
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After the suit had been filed, Mr. Sporkin and I travelled
through the European continent, explaining to our European counter-
parts what had occurred and reporting all of the information that
we had. We also visited some of the banks that we knew had funds
of the IOS complex in their depository or on their books. We alert-
ed them that the movement of those funds without proper court pro-
tection might expose the banks to later litigation, which--I might
tell you as an aside--proved true.
Part of the SEC's program was to alert cooperative countries
around the world to what we saw as a very massive and complicated
fraud that had been going on at least for a couple of years. After
the appointment of the receiver, we were faced with the type of
problem that has been discussed here. How do you liquidate this
enterprise that had companies and investments throughout the world?
B. International Cooperation in the IOS Case
In a meeting held in Luxembourg in June 1973, an intergovern-
mental committee was formed and it was agreed that the I0S funds
(one of which had been set up in the Netherlands Antilles, another
in Luxembourg, and two others in Canada) would be liquidated under
the various statutory provisions available in the respective coun-
tries in which they had been organized. It was left to the cooperat-
ing government authority as to how it would facilitate the initia-
tion of a specific liquidation. The arrangement worked exceptionally
well. Appropriate consent orders were worked out and entered in the
U.S. action between the SEC, the U.S. receiver, and the fund liquida-
tors appointed in the other countries. This permitted a coordinated
effort. It also helped to avoid jurisdictional and secrecy questions.
Through the concentrated efforts of the fund liquidators and other
liquidators, subsequently appointed as additional entities were placed
in liquidation, hundreds of millions of dollars of IOS assets ulti-
mately were recovered.
Let me go back and mention a number of other steps that were
taken after the SEC suit was filed that helped to prevent the illi-
cit transfer of lOS funds and assets. Despite the pendency of the
action, the transfer of IOS monies and properties was continuing as
part of an ongoing and continuing fraud. Consequently, admonitions
were given to those associated with the case that this was so and
that action could be taken against anyone whose assistance resulted
in further looting of the IOS funds. As a result, we were alerted
to various attempts by defendants to transfer or obtain control over
1OS assets. For example, we received information that certain of
the defendants were about to move forty million dollars out of an
account belonging to IOS in a London bank. Now, how do you stop
forty million dollars from being moved when you just have hours to
take action?
You pick up the phone and call the London bank and tell them
you understand that they have a forty million dollar deposit in a
specified account, which is a part of the IOS funds, and that it
would be unwise and poor business practice on their part to move
these funds without being sure that they are receiving proper author-
ization to do so. Banks that respected that kind of advice found in
the end that it was to their benefit, for they had the funds on hand
when later demands were made upon them by liquidators.
The other thing we were able to do vividly illustrates the
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effectiveness of cooperation between regulatory authorities that the
speakers here have been talking about. Because of our close rela-
tionship with the Quebec Securities Commission we were able to ob-
tain control over more than a hundred million dollars. We received
information that IOS monies deposited in a Bahamas bank had been
placed in an account in a Montreal bank. We telephone this informa-
tion to the Quebec Securities Commission Chairman. He promptly
issued a freeze order against this account, as well as three other
discovered accounts. Upon the Bahamas bank's representation that
one of the accounts was a transit account required for their daily
business, and after consulting with us, the Chairman agreed to un-
freeze that account. However, the freeze on this account was reim-
posed the next day, upon discovery that the Bahamas bank had moved
out almost half of the four million dollars in the account.
Similar protective actions were taken by the Ontario Securi-
ties Commission over assets located in that province, and the Luxem-
bourg Banking Commissioner also immediately took action to preserve
the remaining IOS assets still within his jurisdiction.
I previously mentioned the intergovernment committee that was
established in Luxembourg in June of 1973. This ad hoc group, now
consisting of representatives from the U.S. SEC, the Ontario and
Quebec Securities Commissions, the Dominion of Canada, and the Luxem-
bourg Banking Commission, has continued up to the present time to
oversee the activities of the IOS liquidators. It has been formally
recognized by courts involved in IOS liquidations. It has been suc-
cessful in resolving disputes among the liquidators and, in general,
in expediting what is perhaps one of the most difficult and compli-
cated international liquidations [37].
Now, what does all of this demonstrate? It demonstrates that
if you are going to meet these international problems that arise
from time to time, you can talk about formal arrangements, you can
talk about bilateral arrangements (and they have been used by the
U.S. Department of Justice to make information developed by the SEC
in its investigations of questionable corporate payments available
to other countries), but you still must have a cooperative spirit
among the various countries of the world. When they recognize that
they have mutual problems, such as an insider trading case or a mani-
pulation, they willdevise among themselves a practical method to
meet their present needs. That, I have found, is the most productive
approach, while you try to work on formal agreements that will take
care of common problems. The basic fact is that you need cooperation
based on an ability to relate to the other countries. You need to
establish trust and confidence among regulators, so that a government
regulator in Canada, on the basis of a telephone call from his coun-
terpart in the U.S., would feel comfortable using his own regulatory
authority to cooperate in a worldwide endeavor to protect investors.
MR. MUNDHET14: Thank you, Irv. You have elaborated an impor-
tant argument for the adoption of Lee and Harold's proposal. Formali-
zation regularizes contacts so that people can respond quickly to
create the flexible ad hoc arrangements for special situations which
you described as being essential.
Over a year ago in Geneva, the International Faculty for Capi-
tal Markets and Corporate Law organized its first public conference.
That conference included a substantial session on the regulation of
multinational banking institutions. The conference focused on the
need for bank supervisors to take a multinational view if they were
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to discharge their responsibility in overseeing a business which was
becoming increasingly international.
This year's conference has carried forward that theme and has
noted its application to the securities business. Here too interna-
tionalization is becoming more prevalent. Regulatory mechanisms
must grow in a way which recognizes this development. The Williams-
Spencer proposal to securities regulators that they adopt the Cooke
Committee precedent as a helpful model is highly significant. Some
formalization of links among regulators should not only enhance the
effectiveness of the informal techniques of cooperation, but should
also insure the regular exchange of information and ideas.
The International Faculty hopes that this conference will
hasten the forging of the formal and informal links which help cre-
ate a regulatory environment that facilitates multinational activity,
but guards against the potential abuse which occurs where regulation
fails because it does not travel well beyond national boundaries.
NOTES
[I) Securities Exchange Act Release No. 16385, 44 Fed. Reg. 70,349 (1979).
[2] There are a total of seventy-eight listings in foreign countries,
mainly in Europe.
[3] Bank of France statistics.
[4] In France the stock exchange is supervised by the Commission des
Operations de Bourse, called the Commission or COB.
(5] Law of December 23, 1970, which modifies the ordinance 67-833 of
September 28, 1967
[61 See the annual reports of the COB, 1970 to 1980, under paragraph
"Investigations."
[7] Principle No. 9 of the European Code of Conduct relating to transactions
in transferable securities:
Any person who comes into possession of information, in exer-
cising his profession or carrying out his duties, which is not
public and which relates to a company or to the market in its
securities or to any event of general interest to the market,
which is price-sensitive, should refrain from carrying out,
directly or indirectly, any transaction in which such informa-
tion is used, and should refrain from giving the information
to another person so that he may profit from it before the
information becomes public.
[8] COB General Regulations on Take-over Bids.
[9] COB General Regulations on Take-over Bids, D.2; July 25, 1978.
[101 Stockbrokers company's regulation - article 199; COB General Regulations
on Take-over Bids, D.5.
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11] Law No. 80-538, July 16, 1980 concerning the communication of documents
or information of an economic, commercial, industrial, financial or
technical nature to aliens whether natural or artificial persons.
[12] Section 378 of the Criminal Code:
Les mddecins, chirurgiens et autres officers de sant , ainsi
que les pharmaciens, les sages-femmes et toutes autres personnes
dpositaires, par 4tat ou profession ou par fonctions temporaries
ou permanentes, des secrets qu'on leur confie, qui, hors le cas
o la loi les oblige ou les autorise a se porter d~nonciateurs,
auront r~vel' ces secrets, seront punis d'un emprisonnement
d'un mois a six mois et d'une amende (L. 29 d6c. 1956, art. 7;
L. n* 77-1468 du 30 dec. 1977, art. 16) de 500 F a 8,000 F.
[13] Section 19 of the law of December 2, 1945: "tous ceux qui, a un
titre quelconque, participent soit a la direction, 1 l'administration
ou au contr~le des banques nationalis6es, soit au contro-le des
banques non nationalises, sont tenus au secret professionnel".
[14] Article 17, law of June 13, 1941.
[15] Article 5, Ordinance of September 28, 1967.
[16] Supra note 11.
[171 Id.
[18] The Companie G~nerale Mlaritime had to pay $200,000 pursuant to a
consent decree.
[19] National Assembly--June 24, 1980; Senate-June 30, 1980.
[20] The Hague Convention of March 18, 1970, concerning the transmission
of evidence on civil and commercial matters in a foreign proceeding.
[21] An example of such agreements is the treaty between the U.S.A. and the
Swiss Confederation on mutual assistance in criminal matters, May 25,
1973.
(22] Draft directive prepared by the Financial Division of the Commission.
[23] Council Directive of March 5, 1979 coordinating the conditions for the
admission of securities to official stock exchange listing, 22 O.J. Eur.
Comm. (No. L 66) 21 (1979). Council Directive of March 17, 1980 coordinat-
int the requirements for the drawing up, scrutiny, and distribution of the
listing particulars to be published for the admission of securities to
official stock exchange listing, 23 O.J. Eur. Comm. (No. L 100) 1 (1980).
[24] Council Directive of March 17, 1980,section V, article 26.
[25] Council Directive of March 17, 1980,section IV, article 24.
[26] Inter-American Conference of Securities Commissions and Similar Agencies
held in September 8-12, 1980.
[27] Ordinance of September 28, 1967, article 6.
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[28] With respect to the problem of the application of tender offer rules
to foreign issuers, the COB, for its part, taking into account in-
ternational law and French regulations, is of the view that the
governing regulations should be those of the state in which the
target company is domiciled.
[291 Commission Recommendation of July 25, 1977 concerning a European Code
of Conduct relating to transactions on transferable securities--
Explanatory memorandum 2, 20 O.J. Eur. Comm. (No. L 212) 37 (1977).
[301 Commission Recommendation of July 25, 1977: IV Implementation of the
European Code of Conduct article 15-3.
[311 The meetings are held in Brussels generally in November.
[32] See note 23 supra.
[33] See Appendices XVIII-A and B infra at 308 and 312.
[34] See article 4, infra at 314.
[35] For a complete description of the settlement, see In re OS, Ltd. (S.A.)
d/bla Investors Overseas Services, SEC Release 8083 (May 23, 1967).
[36] For additional details concerning IOS and the work of the OS
intergovernment committee, see Loomis and Grant, The U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission, Financial Institutions Outside the U.S. and
Extraterritorial Application of the U.S. Securities Laws, I J. Comp.
Corp. L. & Sec. Reg. 3, 19 (1978). See also pages 8 to 10 for a
discussion of other litigation arising out of the lOS case and pages
20 and 21 for another example of international cooperation in an SEC
injunction action.
[37] See SEC v. Robert L. Vesco et al., [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) '193,671 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 1972).
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APPENDIX XVIII-A
AGREEMENT ON THE OBSERVANCE OF CARE IN ACCEPTING FUNDS
AND ON THE PRACTISING OF BANKING SECRECY
AGREEMENT
between
the banks domiciled in Switzerland and the Swiss Bankers' Association on the one
hand and
the Swiss National Bank, on the other hand
on the observance of care in accepting funds and on the practising of banking
secrecy.
The signatory banks and the Swiss Bankers' Association
in their endeavour to maintain Switzerland's good
reputation as a financial centre and to combat
criminalism,
with intent to confirm, to lay down in a binding way and to
define the established rules of good conduct in bank management,
conclude with the Swiss National Bank the following agreement:
I. Object
Article 1
The object of the agreement is
- to insure that the identity of the bank clients is reliably ascertained
- to prevent that by the improper use of the banking secrecy acts are made
possible or facilitated that are considered to be improper within the mean-
ing of this agreement
II. Improper Acts
Article 2
Considered to be improper within the meaning of this agreement are:
a) the opening and keeping of accounts and deposits of securities without
ascertaining the identity of the owner (Art. 3 to 7),
b) the acceptance of funds acquired, recognizable to the bank, by acts that,
according to Swiss law, are punishable or call for extradition (Art. 4 and 5),
c) aiding and abetting capital flight, tax evasion and so forth (Art. 8 and 9).
III. Observance of Care in
Respect of the Acceptance of Funds
Article 3
I. Ascertaining the identity of the person entitled.
The banks undertake not to open bank accounts and securities deposits, not to
effect fiduciary investments and not to provide safe-deposit facilities unless
they have ascertained with such care as, according to circumstances, can rea-
sonably be expected who the beneficial owner of the funds to be credited or to
be invested or who the renter of the safe deposit box is.
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Article 4
2. Ascertainment of the origin of the funds
The banks undertake not to transact any business if it is known to them or if
it should be known to them in exercising reasonable care that the funds are
entrusted to them for purposes that are considered to be improper within the
meaning of this agreement.
Article 5
3. Professional Secrets
1. If the client acts via a person that is to observe professional secrecy by
law, or via a trustee, the bank is to ask of that intermediary a written state-
ment to the effect that the owner is known to him and that no improper transac-
tions within the meaning of this agreement are involved.
2. A written statement can be dispensed with if, based on all circumstances,
on hitherto existing business relations, on the known care exercised by the
holder of professional secrecy, etc., the bank may assume that these preconditions
are fulfilled.
3. No written statement is required in respect of accounts and securities de-
posits of domestic and foreign banks.
Article 6
4. Procedure
a) in general
1. In case of doubt, the banks require of the customer who wishes to open an
account or a securities deposit a written statement as to whether he acts for
own account or for account of a third party, in which latter case he is requested
to state for whose account.
2. The banks use a standard form which constitutes an integral part of this
agreement.
Article 7
b) in respect of domicile-establishing companies
1. Of domestic and foreign companies registered merely to establish legal domi-
cile are to be claimed
(a) an extract from Trade Register or a certificate of equal value,
(b) the written statement by the competent organs certifying the control
situation,
(c) the same data on the controlling individuals as if these presons
actually acted as customers.
To be regarded as domicile-establishing companies within the meaning of this
agreement are all companies, institutions, foundations, trust enterprises, etc.
that do not run in Switzerland any trading or manufacturing firms or any other
business operated according to commercial principles.
2. In cases where the group membership of a domicile-establishing company or the
control situation and the identity of the controlling individuals are known to
the bank, it may do without the data stipulated under lit. (b) and (c).
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IV. Aiding and Abetting Capital Flight,
Tax Evasion and so forth
Article 8
I. Capital Flight
The banks undertake not to aid and abet in any active way capital transfers from
countries having introduced legislation to restrict the investment of funds
abroad, such as, for instance, by receiving in an organized way clients abroad,
outside their own bank premises, to accept funds; by commissioning agents abroad
with a view to organizing capital flight; by promising commission payments to
capital-flight agents and to people mediating flight capital.
Article 9
2. Tax evasion and so forth
The banks do not support attempts at deception made by their clients vis-1-vis
authorities at home and abroad, in particular vis-a-vis tax authorities, neither
by incomplete nor by other misleading attestations.
V. Numbered Accounts and Numbered Deposits
Article 10
The prescriptions of the present agreement apply without restriction to accounts
and securities deposits designated by numbers only or by passwords.
VI. Screening of Existing Accounts
Article 11
In respect of existing customers holding accounts and/or security deposits in
excess of I million francs, the requirements stipulated in Art. 6 and 7 are to
be fulfilled within the period of one year as from the date on which this agree-
ment is put into force.
VII. Dissolution of relations
Article 12
The banks undertake to break off relations with customers if, in the course of
business, suspicion should arise to the effect that the information obtained on
the beneficial owner is not correct or that the customer performs acts through
the bank which, within the meaning of this agreement, are improper (Art. 2, par.b).
VIII. Control
Article 13
1. By their signature to this agreement, the banks commission and authorize the
auditing agency imposed on them by banking legislation to control by means of
random tests the observance of this agreement on the occasion of their ordinary
bank examination and to report to the Arbitration Committee set up under Art. 14,
as well as to the Federal Banking Commission, any offences or any founded suspi-
cion as to possible offences.
2. The Swiss National Bank will make known to the authorized auditing agencies
the text of this agreement as well as the list of signatories and thus their
mandate.
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IX. Sanctions
Article 14
1. For the ascertainment and punishment of offences against this agreement, an
Arbitration Committee incorporated in Zurich is set up, comprising two repre-
sentatives each of the Swiss National Bank and the Swiss Bankers' Association
and which is presided over by a Federal Judge designated unanimously by these
representatives. The Secretariat of the Arbitration Committee will be maintained
at the Swiss National Bank.
2. The Arbitration Committee may impose on the bank convicted of an offence
against the agreement a conventional fine of up to 10 million francs; in assess-
ing the conventional fine, due regard is to be paid to the seriousness of the
breach of contract, the degree of the bank's fault and its financial situation.
The Arbitration Committee allocates the conventional fine to charitable insti-
tutions.
3. The Arbitration Committee arranges the procedure; Art. 36 to 65 of the
Federal Law of December 4, 1947 on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
Art. 22 to 26 of the Federal Law of December 16, 1943 on the Organization of the
Federal Judicial Practice apply mutatis mutandis.
4. The members of the Arbitration Committee are to observe strict secrecy as
to the facts come to their knowledge in the course of the proceedings (Art. 47
of the Banking Law).
5. The Arbitration Committee informs the Federal Banking Commission of its
decisions for them to examine the question whether the persons entrusted with
the administration and management of the bank involved still give "warranty for
an irreproachable conduct of business" within the meaning of Art. 3 par. 2 lit.c
of the Banking Law.
X. Coming into Force
Article 15
1. This agreement enters into force on July 1, 1977 and is valid for a fixed
period of five years.
2. Subsequently, and unless it is not terminated by the Swiss Bankers' Associa-
tion or by the Swiss National Bank at three months' notice, it is looked upon
as being automatically renewed for further periods of one year each.
3. Each signatory bank is entitled, subject to three months' notice, to denounce
the agreement as per the end of the contract year, for the first time as per
June 30, 1982.
4. The signatory banks authorize the board of directors of the Swiss Bankers'
Association, in cooperation with the Swiss National Bank, to make further defi-
nitions or any modifications to the agreement that may prove necessary on the
strength of the experience gained.
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APPENDIX XVIII-B
COMENTARIES ON THE SWISS BANKING AGREEMENT
PREAIBLE
The signatory banks and the Swiss Bankers'Association
- in their endeavour to maintain Switzerland's good reputation
as a financial centre and to combat economic criminalism,
- with intent to confirm, to lay down in a binding way and to
define the established rules of good conduct in bank management,
conclude with the Swiss National Bank the following Agreement:
PRELIMINARY REFARKS:
1. The Agreement covers all the signatory banks' offices domiciled in
Switzerland, but not their foreign branches, representatives and subsidiaries
(but see point 15 under Art. 3).
2. The Agreement does not alter the banks' obligation to observe banking
secrecy. It cannot, nor is it intended to
- incorporate foreign fiscal, economic or currency regulations
into Swiss law or declare them to be applicable to the Swiss
banks (unless this is already the case under existing interna-
tional treaties and Swiss law);
- affect current legal practice in the field of private interna-
tional law.
Swiss legislation and legal practice and the treaties Switzerland has concluded
with other countries continue to represent the legal norms for banks in Switzer-
land.
OBJECT
Article 1 - The object of the Agreement is
- to insure that the identity of the bank clients is reliably ascertained,
- to prevent that by the improper use of the banking secrecy acts are
made possible or facilitated that are considered to be improper
within the meaning of this Agreement.
3. The Agreement is aimed at insuring that the identity of each bank cus-
tomer is carefully established and thus enabling the authorities to make effective
use of the duty under federal or cantonal regulations to give evidence or dis-
close information.
4. The Agreement lays down in binding form established rules of good conduct
in bank management; normal banking transactions are not to be impeded by the
Agreement.
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IMPROPER ACTS
Article 2 - Considered to be improper within the meanina of this Agreement are:
a) the opening and keeping of accounts and deposits of securities
without ascertaining the identity of the owner (Art. 3 to 7),
b) the acceptance of funds acquired, recognizable to the bank, by
acts that, according to Swiss law, are punishable or call for
extradition (Art. 4 and 5),
c) aiding and abetting capital flight, tax evasion and so forth
(Art. 8 and 9).
5. "Improper" is equated with breach of contract. Engaging in an improper
act represents contravention of the Agreement and is subject to the sanctions
dealt with in Art. 14.
6. The list of acts which are regarded as improper within the meaning of the
subsequent articles is exhaustive. The only applicable definitions of what are
considered to be improper acts are those to be found in the articles of the Agree-
ment referred to in parenthesis in sub-sections a-c. Art. 2 cannot be inter-
preted in isolation.
OBSERVANCE OF CARE IN RESPECT OF
THE ACCEPTANCE OF FUNDS
Article 3 - Ascertaining the identity of the person entitled.
The banks undertake not to open bank accounts and securities,
not to effect fiduciary investments and not to provide safe-deposit
facilities unless they have ascertained with such care as. according
to circumstances, can reasonably be expected, who the beneficial
owner of the funds to be credited or to be invested or who the renter
of the safe deposit box is.
I. SCOPE
7. The obligation to check the identity applies to all accounts, bank books
and securities deposits - except as indicated otherwise under point 20 - whether
carried under the name of the bank customer or designated by number.
8. Savings books, made out to the bearer, too, may not be issued without
an identity check. Unless the book is placed in its safe-custody, however, the
bank is not in a position and hence not obliged to trace the book's subsequent
ownership or to know the holder at any given time.
9. Except for ascertaining the origin of funds as treated in Art. 4 (see
points 30-32), there is no obligation to check identity with regard to transac-
tions over the counter (changing money, purchase and sale of precious metals,
cash subscription to bank bonds and debentures, cashing of cheques, etc.).
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II. EXTENT OF IDENTITY CHECK
10. Mhen a safe is being leased, only the identity of the lessee has to be
established. The procedure should follow points 12-20.
11. At the opening of an account or securities deposit the identity of both
the contracting party (client) and the beneficial o-ner [wirtschaftlich Berech-
tigter] must be established in accordance with the following guidelines.
III. IDENTIFICATION OF CONTRACTING PARTY
A. Individuals
a) Domiciled in Switzerland
12. At a meeting with the customer in person, the bank checks the contracting
party's identity by means of an official document (passport, identity card, dri-
ver's licence, etc.); individuals domiciled in Switzerland who are already known
to the bank personally do not have to produce any document.
13. If the customer relationship is initiated through correspondence, the
bank checks the identity of a contracting party domiciled in Switzerland by con-
firming the address indicated via postal delivery or some other equally valid
method.
b) Not domiciled in Switzerland
14. At a meeting with the customer in person, the bank identifies a contract-
ing party without permanent domicile or domiciled abroad by checking an official
identity document. Identity can also be established by virtue of a written
recommendation from a foreign branch or representative of the bank itself, from
a foreign correspondent bank, or from one of the bank's clients who is knowrn
personally to be trustworthy.
15. A signatory bank can accept the recommendation of one of its foreign
branches, subsidiaries or representatives, provided it has requested the offices
involved to check the identity of persons they recommend as in the light of the
Agreement.
16. If the customer relationship is initiated through correspondence, the
bank has to request that the signature of the contracting party abroad be authen-
ticated by the appropriate consulate, a correspondent bank, or a customer whom
the bank knows personally to be trustworthy. The address indicated should be
confirmed via postal delivery or some other equally valid method.
B. Legal entities and companies
a) Registered in Switzerland
17. The bank is to establish whether the organization concerned appears in
the "Schweizerisches }landelsamtsblatt / Feuille officielle suisse du commerce"
or the "Schweizerisches Ragionenebuch / Annuaire suisse du Registre du commerce";
otherwise identity is to be established by means of an extract from the "commer-
cial register" [Handelsregister / Registre du commerce].
18. The identity of an organization not entered in the commercial register
(associations, foundations) is to be checked by confirming the address indicated
by means of postal delivery or another equally valid method.
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b) Registered abroad
19. In the case the identity check has to take place by means of an extract
from the "commercial register" or another, equally valid document (for in-
stance, certificate of incorporation).
C. Exceptions
20. The identity of a contracting party domiciled or registered in Switzer-
land does not have to be checked when the customer wants to open
(a) a salary account,
(b) a savings book or account, a deposit book or account, an investment
book or account, designated by name and with an initial sum of less
than Sfr. 100,000.
(c) a current account, time deposit or similar account to meet professional
or business needs, or
(d) an account for the paying in of share capital maintained at a cantonal
depositary for payment of shares when a company is being founded or
increasing its capital.
IV. ASCERTAINING THE IDENTITY OF THE PERSON ENTITLED
[wirtschaftlich Berechtigter]
21. The beneficial owner [wirtschaftlich Berechtigter] of the assets should
be identified at the time an account or securities deposit is opened.
22. All reasonable care which can be expected under the circumstances must
be exercised in identifying the beneficial owner [wirtschaftlich Berechtigter].
The bank may assume that the contracting party and the beneficial owner [wirt-
schaftlich Berechtigter] are identical. This can no longer be assumed, however,
if anything unusual is observed (see points 25 and 42-46).
A. Individuals
23. If the contracting party declares that he is acting for a third party,
the bank has to obtain the third party's full name, address and country of
domicile.
B. Legal entities and companies
24. If the contracting party is representing a legal entity or a company,
the bank has to file its exact name and the precise address of its registered
office.
V. CASES OF DOUBT
25. Whenever there are any doubts the procedure of Art. 6 should be applied,
particularly when details of the identity supplied appear doubtful or there are
indications that the contracting party may not be identical with the beneficial
owner [wirtschaftlich Berechtigter] (see points 42-46).
26. Special provisions apply to professional secrets and to domicile-estab-
lishing companies [Sitzgesellschaften] (Art. 5 and 7, points 34-41 and 47-53).
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VI. CONTROLS
27. The bank has to ensure that its in-house auditors and its auditors
[bankengesetzliche Revisionsstelle] can verify that the identification proce-
dures have been carried out.
28. An appropriate record should be kept of the full name, address and coun-
try of domicile of the contracting party, as well as the means used to establish
this party's identity. Any documents furnished in connection with legal entities
should be preserved.
29. The indication specified in points 23 and 24 on the identity of the
beneficial owner [wirtschaftlich Berechtigter] must be accessible.
Article 4 - Ascertaining of the origin of the fund
The banks undertake not to transact any business if it is known
to them or if it should be known to them in exercising reasonable
care that the funds are entrusted to them for purposes that are
considered to be improper within the meaning of this agreement.
30. The bank here commits itself not to conduct any business with money it
knows or ought to know, in light of concrete evidence, to have been acquired
in activities which would be punishable or subject to extradition under Swiss
law (see Art. 2 b).
31. This provision is not limited to the opening of an account or securities
deposit, but extends to all bank business. It also applies to cash transactions
over counter (see point 9 on Art. 3).
32. If the bank has concrete indications of criminal acts committed by
people with whom it maintains business relationships or who would like to enter
into such relationships, the business relationships concerned are to be can-
celled (see points 66-68 on Art. 12).
Article 5 - Professional secrets
1. If the client acts via a person that is to observe professional
secrecy by law, or via a trustee, the bank is to ask of that inter-
mediary a written statement to the effect that the owner is known
to him and that no improper transactions within the meaning of this
Agreement are involved.
2. A written statement can be dispensed with if, based on all cir-
cumstances, on hitherto existing business relations, on the known
care exercised by the holder of professional secrecy, etc., the
bank may assume that these preconditions are fulfilled.
3. No w.ritten statement is required in respect of accounts and
securities deposits of domestic and foreign banks.
I. PRIVILEGED PROFESSIONS
33. Lawyers and notaries in Switzerland are bound by professional secrecy
which is protected by law.
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34. An equivalent position is held by professional trustees and asset
managers.
35. When such parties are domiciled or have their registered office in
Switzerland, they can establish their quality as professional trustees or asset
managers by virtue (for example) of membership in one of the associations affili-
ated with the "Schweizerischen Treuhand- und Revisionskammer" or possession of
a cantonal licence to practice or a federal diploma (such as that of dipl.
Bicherexperte).
36. Non-residents bound by professional secrecy and non-resident professional
trustees, who are not already known to the bank in that capacity, can establish
it by--among other things--presenting an authenticated licence to practice in
the country concerned or being confirmed by the foreign branch or representative
of the Swiss bank involved or by a foreign correspondent bank.
II. SIGNING THE WRITTEN STATEMENT
37. When the party bound by professional secrecy is a legal entity or a
company, the written statement must bear the corporate signature.
38. The written statement can be dispensed with as an exception when the
party bound by professional secrecy or the trustee is known to the bank as care-
ful and trustworthy from previous business relations, by an excellent professional
reputation, or through some other means.
39. If a person bound by professional secrecy is representing a company or
legal entity in which he is acting as a director or member of the management,
the written statement must always be provided on the standard form referred to
in Art. 6, par. 2.
Ill. EXCEPTIONS FOR BANKS
40. No written statement has to be provided for accounts and securities
deposits belonging to banks. Companies subject to the Federal Law of Bank and
Savings Banks qualify as domestic banks. Companies registered abroad are con-
sidered to be banks if they qualify as such under the law of their country of
domicile.
IV. ASCERTAINING IDENTITY
41. The identity of persons who present themselves as bound by professional
secrecy should be established in accordance with points 12-20; points 27 and 28
also apply here accordingly.
Article 6 - PROCEDURE
a) in general
2) In case of doubt, the banks require of the customer who wishes
to open an account or a securities deposit a written statement as
to whether he acts for own account or for account of a third party,
in which latter case he is requested to state for whose account.
2) The banks use a standard form which constitutes an integral
part of this agreement.
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42. If there is any doubt that the contracting party is acting for his own
account, the "Declaration on Opening an Account or a Deposit of Securities or
on Renting a Safe-Deposit Box" form should be submitted to him .for signature.
43. As a rule, doubts arise as to the identity of the beneficial owner
[wirtschaftlich Berechtigter] in one of the following cases:
a) An application for opening an account or a securities deposit is
made by a person domiciled in Switzerland. At the same time, a power of
attorney is issued to a person who clearly cannot stand in a sufficiently close
relationship to the account-holder (for instance, a person living abroad), or
other unusual aspects are observed.
b) The application to open an account or securities deposit is made by
a person domiciled in Switzerland whose financial situation is known to the bank.
The assets presented or indicated, however, do not conform to the known financial
circumstances.
c) The application to open an account or securities deposit is made by
a person domiciled abroad, who has been introduced to the bank (see points 14 and
15). At the same time, a power of attorney is issued to a person who clearly
does not stand in a sufficiently close relationship to the account holder.
d) The application to open an account or securities deposit is made by
a person domiciled abroad, who has been introduced to the bank (see points 14 and
15) and whose financial situation is known to the bank. The assets presented
or indicated, however, do not conform to the known financial circumstances.
e) The application to open an account or securities deposit is made by
a person domiciled abroad, who has not been introduced to the bank. The initial
meeting with the customer concerning the opening of the account or deposit gives
rise to unsual observations.
f) The account or securities deposit is applied for in correspondence by
a person domiciled abroad, who supplies an authenticated signature (see point 16)
but is not known personally to the bank and wants to make a deposit of more than
Sfr. 100,000.
44. If serious doubts remain as to the correctness of the customer's written
declaration which cannot be removed through further clarifications, the bank
declines to open the account or securities deposit (see point 68 on Art. 12).
45. The standard form to be used under Art. 6 par. 2 can be ordered from the
Swiss Bankers' Association in Basle in German, French, Italian, and English.
46. The banks are free to produce their own forms to fit their particular
needs. These forms must include the full text of the standard form, and the
portions referring to the significance of banking secrecy, the banks' duty to
disclose information, and the establishment of accounts and securities under num-
bers or passwords, may not be printed in smaller or fainter type than used for
the rest of the text.
Article 7 - b) In respect of domicile-establishing companies
1) Of domestic and foreign companies registered merely to establish
legal domicile are to be claimed
a) an extract from the Trade Register* or a certificate of equal
value,
*commercial register; see point 17 [Handelsregister / Registre du commerce]
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b) the written statement by the competent organs certifying
the control situation,
c) the same data on the controlling individuals as if these
persons actually acted as customers.
To be regarded as domicile-establishing companies within the
meaning of this Agreement are all companies, institutions, founda-
tions, trust enterprises, etc. that do not run in Switzerland any
trading or manufacturing firms or any other business operated
according to commercial principles.
2) In cases where the group membership of a domicile-establishing
company or the control situation and the identity of the controlling
individuals are known to the bank, it may do without the data
stipulated under lit. b) and c).
I. DEFINITION
47. Regardless of a company's objective, activity, and registered office
(domiciled in Switzerland or abroad), it qualifies as a domicile-establishing
company [Sitzgesellschaft] if
a) it does not maintain its own business premises domiciled with
an attorney's office, a trust company, a bank, etc. or
b) it does not employ its own staff working exclusively on its
behalf, or the people it does employ are solely engaged in
administrative tasks (keeping the books, handling correspondence
under instructions from the persons or companies controlling the
domicile-establishing company [Sitzgesellschaft].
48. Swiss companies with their own operations, in which the board of direc-
tors and the management are identical (such as in a one-man company) do not
count as domicile-establishing companies [Sitzgesellschaft].
I. CONTROL
49. A company is controlled by those people or groups of people who have a
direct or indirect share in the company with more than half the authorized capi-
tal or votes, or who recognizably exercise a dominant influence on the company
in some other way.
50. Mhen a company is itself controlled by another legal entity, the bank
has to ascertain the identity of the individual(s)* ultimately in control. This
entails having the contracting party complete the "Declaration on Opening an
Account or a Deposit . . . . " form. Point 44 is applicable here.
51. The form does not have to be used when the bank already knows the group
membership [corporate affiliation] of the domicile-establishing company [Sitz-
gesellschaft] or its control situation (including the identity of the persons
ultimately in control).
52. Art. 5 par. 1 (points 33-41) applies to persons bound by professional
secrecy and trustees who are officers or directors of domicile-establishing
companies [Sitzgesellschaft]. The written statement is to be requested in every
case.
*"Natural persons" on the "Declaration .... " form.
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III. ASCERTAINING THE IDENTITY
53. The identity of the individuals controlling a domicile-establishing
company is to be ascertained and recorded as stipulated in point 23.
AIDING AND ABETTING CAPITAL FLIGHT,
TAX EVASION AND SO FORTH
Article 8 - Capital flight
The banks undertake not to aid and abet in any active %ray
capital transfers from countries having introduced legislation
to restrict the investment of funds abroad, such as. for instance
by receiving in an organized way clients abroad, outside their
o:wn bank premises, to accept funds; by commissioning agents
abroad with a view to organizing capital flight; by promising
commission payments to capital-flight agents and to people
mediating flight capital.
54. "Capital flight" is defined here as unauthorized capital transfer in the
form of foreign exchange, securities or bank notes from a country prohibiting or
restricting such transfers of capital abroad by its residents.
55. The bank is forbidden to render active assistance in the flight of capi-
tal such as
a) by the organized reception of customers abroad outside the
bank premises for purposes of accepting funds (visits abroad
to look after customer relations, however are permissible so
long as the bank's official neither accept funds whose trans-
feris prohibited nor gives advice on illegal capital transfers);
b) by commissioning agents to organize capital flight;
c) by promising commissions or other compensation to those who
assist or arrange capital flight;
d) by pointing out contact people who organize or assist capital
flight.
56. For the rest, assets of clients domiciled abroad can continue to be
accepted in Switzerland, providing the provision concerning funds acquired by
criminal acts are observed (see points 30-32 on Art. 4).
Article 9 - Tax evasion and so forth
The banks do not support attempts at deception made by their
clients vis-a-vis authorities at home and abroad in particular
vis-a-vis tax authorities, neither by incomplete nor by other
misleading attentions.
57. The bank is forbidden to give incomplete or otherwise misleading attesta-
tions to the customer himself or, at the customer's wish, to domestic or foreign
authorities.
The term "authorities at home and abroad" is intended in particular to
mean tax authorities, customs authorities and currency and bank authorities.
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58. The prohibition extends particularly to special attestations which are
drawn up on behalf of authorities at the client's request.
The bank is not allowed to make misleading or deceptive alterations on
the forms it routinely provides, such as account and deposit statements, credit
and debit advices, or settlement notes for foreign exchange, coupon and stock
market transactions.
59. Attestations are incomplete when for the purpose of deceiving authori-
ties relevant facts are suppressed, for instance when the bank--at its customer's
request--omits certain items from a special declaration or an account or deposit
statement.
Account and deposit statements do not have to mention, however, that the
same client maintains other accounts or securities deposits.
60. Attestations are misleading when facts are presented untruly with the
intention of deceiving the authorities, such as
a) by the inclusion of false dates or sums, fictitious rate
or the indication of false beneficiaries or debtors;
b) by the attestation of fictitious claims or liabilities
(regardless of whether the attestation corresponds to the
books of the bank or not).
NUMBERED ACCOUNTS AND NUMBERED DEPOSITS
Article 10 - The prescriptions of the present Agreement apply without
restriction to accounts and securities deposits designated
by numbers only or by passwords.
61. Statements relating to the totality of business relations with a customer
should also cover the accounts and securities deposits carried under numbers or
passwords.
SCREENING OF EXISTING ACCOUNTS
Article 1i - In respect of existing customers holding accounts and/or security
deposits in excess of 1 million francs, the requirements stipu-
lated in Art. 6 and 7 are to be fulfilled within the period of one
year as from the date on which this Agreement is put into force.
62. The screening of the existing accounts and deposits can also proceed on
the basis of the situation as of 31.12.1976 or 31.12.1977.
63. The review is required when the sum of a customer's accounts taken to-
gether or the total amount represented by the securities deposits comes to more
than I million Swiss francs.
64. The relevant amount can be computed separately for each branch or office
of the bank.
65. The screening of existing accounts or securities deposits is to be com-
pleted by 30th June 1978. Applications for extensions by way of exception
should be filed before this period expires with the Secretariat of the Arbitra-
tion Committee (point 70).
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DISSOLUTION OF RELATIONS
Article 12 - The banks undertake to break off relations with customers if,
in the course of business, suspicion should arise to the effect
that the information obtained on the beneficial owner is not
correct or that the customer performs acts through the bank
which, within the meaning of this Agreement, are improper (Art.
2, par. 6).
66. Existing relations are to be broken off as quickly as possible without
representing a breach of contract with the customer,
a) when the bank has concrete indications that the customer is
using it to conduct business based on activities punishable
or subject to extradition under Swiss law,
b) when the bank ascertains that the customer knowingly provided
it false information on the beneficial owner [wirtschaftlich
Berechtigter] upon opening the account or securities deposit
(subsequent failure to report changes in beneficial ownership
[wirtschaftlich Berechtigter] does not count as knowingly pro-
viding false information).
67. If the bank is not in a position to contact the customer because of
correspondence instructions and a case arises according to point 66 b) above,
the bank can wait until the customer's next visit or the next delivery of
correspondence before breaking off relations.
68. The agreement does not create an obligation to notify prosecuting author-
ities. But should the bank ascertain that an attempt is being made to misuse
its services for the sake of illicit manoeuvres, it is to consider further steps
in order to prevent punishable acts (for instance, alerting the Swiss investiga-
tive authorities).
CONTROL
Article 13 - 1) By their signature to this Agreement, the banks commission
and authorize the auditing agency imposed on them by banking
legislation to control by means of random tests the observance
of this Agreement on the occasion of their ordinary bank exami-
nation and to report to the Arbitration Committee set up under
Art. 14, as well as to the Federal Banking Commission, any
offences or any founded suspicion as to possible offences.
2) The Swiss National Bank will make known to the authorized
auditing agencies the text of this Agreement as well as the
list of signatories and thus their mandate.
SANCTIONS
Article 14 - 1) For the ascertainment and punishment of offences against this
Agreement, an Arbitration Committee incorporated in Zurich is
set up, comprising two representatives each of the Swiss National
Bank and the Swiss Bankers'Association and which is presided over
by a Federal Judge designated unanimously by these representatives.
The Secretariat of the Arbitration Committee will be maintained
at the Swiss National Bank.
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2) The Arbitration Committee may impose on the bank convicted
an offence against the Agreement a conventional fine of up to
10 million francs; in assessing the conventional fine, due
regard is to be paid to the seriousness of the breach of con-
tract, the degree of the bank's fault and its financial situation.
The Arbitration Committee allocates the conventional fine to
charitable institutions.
3) The Arbitration Committee arranges the procedure; Art. 36 to
65 of the Federal Law of December 4, 1947 on the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and Art. 22 to 26 of the Federal Law of
December 16, 1943 on the Organization of the Federal Judicial
Practice apply mutatis mutandis.
4) The members of the Arbitration Committee are to observe strict
secrecy as to the facts come to their knowledge in the course of
of the proceedings (Art. 47 of the Banking Law).
5) The Arbitration Committee informs the Federal Banking Commis-
sion of its decisions for them to examine the question whether
the persons entrusted with the administration and management of
the bank involved still give "warranty for an irreproachable
conduct of business" within the meaning of Art. 3 par. 2 lit. c
of the Banking Law.
69. The Arbitration Committee is to acquaint the banks periodically with
the current tenor of its rulings, taking care that banking and business secrets
are respected.
70. The address of the Secretariat of the Arbitration Commission:
c/o Swiss National Bank
Department I, Legal Section
8002 Zurich
COMING INTO FORCE
Article 15 - 1) This Agreemen-. enters into force on July 1, 1977 and is
valid for a fixed period of five years.
2) Subsequently, and unless it is not [sic] terminated by
the Swiss Bankers' Association or by the Swiss National Bank
at three months' notice, it is looked upon as being automati-
cally renewed for further periods of one year each.
3) Each signatory bank is entitled, subject to three months'
notice, to denounce the Agreement as per the end of the contract
year, for the first time as per June 30, 1982.
4) The signatory banks authorize the board of directors of the
Swiss Bankers' Association, in cooperation with the Swiss Na-
tional Bank, to make further definitions or any modifications
of the Agreement that may prove necessary on the strength of
the experience gained.
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71. The authority set out in Art. 15 par. 4 above does nor empower the
Swiss Bankers'Association to alter the substance of the Agreement to the dis-
advantage of the signatory banks.
72. No authentic interpretation is to be given neither by Swiss Bankers'
Association nor the Swiss National Bank. They are jointly competent for inter-
pretation.
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